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ABSTRACT
The process when U.S. municipalities retire callable bonds early and refinance
them with bonds of a lower coupon rate is called advance refunding. The advance
refunding of debt is a widespread practice in municipal finance; however, the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act of 2017 removed the option to keep this debt tax-exempt and now requires
municipalities to convert from tax-exempt to taxable. The purpose of this research was to
evaluate the impact eliminating advance refunding of municipal debt into tax-exempt
status has on the municipality’s advance refunding decision making process, specifically
at the state level. Municipal governments are still adjusting to the new market dynamics
after passage of the tax legislation and have demonstrated a change in their debt
management decisions regarding advance refunding, even in the low interest rate
environment existing at the time of this study. To capture this change in behavior, both
economic and bond data between 2005 and 2020 were collected across multiple database
platforms. Panel and hierarchical regression models were used to evaluate the time
periods before and after the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act as well as economic regions within
the United States. These models incorporated state-specific variables to evaluate
macroeconomic frictions, a departure from prior studies where researchers evaluated
advance refunding from an aggregate approach of all municipal levels of government and
lacked a public finance approach. Analysis showed that geography played a significant
role in the evaluation of advance refunding activity and state tax revenue served as a
primary driver of state debt management decisions in the existing regulatory
environment. These findings are extremely valuable for policy makers and participants in
the municipal bond markets because interest rates are expected to rise in future years.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
U.S state and local governments, commonly referred to as municipalities, sell taxexempt debt obligations, or bonds, for many purposes. One of the primary reasons is to
finance capital projects such as roads, prisons, schools, and wastewater systems. Issuing
debt allows governments that otherwise would not have the cash flow to complete such
projects, with a repayment schedule typically between 20 to 40 years. Investors find
municipal bonds attractive because the interest is generally exempt from federal income
taxes. This results in investors accepting a lower interest rate than they would otherwise
and allowing the issuers (i.e., municipalities) to have lower borrowing costs.
Due to the long-term nature of these bonds, the issuing governments frequently
aim to achieve debt service savings or need to remove burdensome covenants when their
economic or operational needs change. To do this, governments issue new debt to retire
the existing debt, similar to refinancing a home mortgage. This is the same process
corporate debt takes when a debt issuance becomes callable, except the terminology for
municipal debt is called refunding (Internal Revenue Service [IRS], n.d.)
Municipalities can use two different types of refunding: current or advance. When
a debt issuance becomes callable—or is within 90 days of the call date—the municipality
can issue new, lower coupon debt to finance the retirement of the outstanding debt, called
a current refund (Kalotay & May, 1998). However, an advance refunding occurs before
the call date (IRS, n.d.). Using this method, the government will sell new bonds to buy
back the outstanding debt, typically to allow the municipal issuer to obtain savings from a
decline in interest rates (Government Finance Officers Association [GFOA], 2017;
Kalotay & May, 1998). The focus of this paper is on advance refunding, which occurs
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before the call date.
Significance of the Problem
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017 eliminated the ability of
municipalities to issue tax-exempt advance refunded bonds (Bond Buyer, 2019; Kalotay,
2018). The last comprehensive empirical study focusing on motivations of advance
refunding municipal bonds was published before enactment of the new federal tax law.
Since the new tax law took effect, multiple trade publications and a few academic journal
articles have published articles on the topic, but no authors have explicitly explored the
impact TCJA has had on municipalities’ use of refunding or if motivations have changed.
One reason for this research was to address the dramatic increase in the number of
municipal refunding issuances. In 2017, partially due to a rush of advance refunding
before the implementation of the new tax legislation, a record-setting total of long-term
municipal bond issuances occurred, amounting to $448.6 billion (Bond Buyer, 2019).
That amount included $153.3 billion in refunding issuances and $91 billion exclusively
advance refunding issues (Bond Buyer, 2019; Pierog, 2018). The following year saw
refunding issuances decline by 61% to only $59.8 billion from the impact of the tax
reform legislation prohibiting tax-exempt advance refunding (Bond Buyer, 2019).
However, an unexpected increase in the issuance of taxable bonds occurred in 2019,
totaling $70 billion and posting an increase of 135% when compared to 2018 (Kalotay,
2021; Ryan, 2020). According to industry experts, issuances for taxable municipal bonds
should continue into the foreseeable future (Kalotay, 2021).
Figures 1, 2, and 3 are provided to give both historical context and a visual
example of refunding activity over the last decade. The average Bond Buyer General
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Obligation (GO) 20 index is included to show the average yields because bond yields
drive the decision to refund (Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board [MSRB], 2017).
The time-series graph in Figure 1 shows the dollar volume of issues. A noticeable
spike in both advance and current refundings in December 2017, followed by a steep
decline in 2018, is evident. Notably, a jump in the average bond buyer index occurred
late in 2019. According to theory, this should have deterred refunding issuances;
however, the small jump in early 2020 is contrary to previous findings on refunding
motivation.
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Figure 1
Current and Advance Refundings Compared to Average Bond Buyer 20 Index
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Note. Using Thomson Reuters monthly issuance data from June 1, 2010, through May 31,
2020.
Figure 2 shows the volume of refunding issuances, which is more telling of the
TCJA impact. After the law’s passage in late 2017, the municipal bond market
experienced a 54% reduction in refundings as a percentage of total tax-exempt GO
issuances for the years 2018–2020 relative to the years 2010–2017. Although the current
refunding saw a decline, the number of issuances was less affected than advance
refunding issuances.
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Figure 2
Number of Current and Advance Refundings Compared to all Tax-Exempt General
Obligation Issuances
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Note. Using Thomson Reuters monthly issuance data from June 1, 2010, through May 31,
2020.
Figure 3 shows advance refundings in percentage terms of all tax-exempt GO
issues over the last decade using the Bond Buyer 20 index as a market comparison.
Issuances reduced by 46% in tax-exempt GO bonds, inclusive of all refundings between
the time periods of 2010–2017 and 2018–2020. When illustrated as a monthly
percentage, advance refundings made up 21% of the tax-exempt GO market pre-TCJA,
where after enactment, advance refundings only make up a monthly average of 2%.
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Figure 3
Advance Refundings as Percentage of All Tax-Exempt General Obligation Issues
Compared to Bond Buyer 20 Index
Advance Refundings as Portion of Market
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Note. Using Thomson Reuters monthly issuance data from June 1, 2010, through May 31,
2020.
According to H.R.1 Section 3602 of the TCJA, the interest on advance refunding
bonds will be taxable after 2017, whereas the interest on current refunding bonds will
continue to be tax-exempt (GFOA, 2017). In practice, many municipalities still issue
advance refund bonds (Kalotay, 2018; Leckrone, 2019; Luby & Orr, 2019). The low
interest rate environment contributes to this continued behavior, but concern exists that
interest rates will rise in future years. When this occurs, municipalities that continue to
advance refund their debt will see an increased debt service cost to taxpayers over the
long term.
To remedy this situation, lobbyists have worked to reinstate the ability to issue
tax-exempt advance refunding bonds. Since its elimination in 2017, Congress has
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introduced legislation every year to reinstate the practice, but none have been enacted
into law (To Amend the Internal Revenue Code, 2018; American Infrastructure Bonds
Act, 2020; Investing in Our Communities Act, 2019; LOCAL Infrastructure Act, 2021).
Theoretical Basis for the Study
The central framework for this research was to expand upon the debt management
decision made by municipalities when exercising the option to advance refund their debt.
Researchers in the literature had concluded three primary motivations (Wood, 2008);
however, this was before the removal of tax-exempt status. Post-TCJA, municipality
behavior has changed, indicating a departure from established debt management practices
(see Figure 3). One of the industry’s leading academics concluded that “the demands of
professional debt management will make it imperative that issuers and their financial
advisors employ option-based analytics for determining the optimal time to call and
refund” (Kalotay, 2018, p. 69).
Authors of numerous papers have investigated municipal bond pricing relative to
their taxable counterparts. The empirical literature showed an unexplained relation
between the yields of tax-exempt and taxable bonds, where the spread decreases with
maturity (Chalmers, 1998, 2006; Dwek, 2002; Erickson et al., 2003; Lin et al., 2009).
Many studies have shown that short-term tax-exempt bond yields are, on average, equal
to 1 minus the highest marginal corporate tax rate times the short-term taxable yield
(Fama 1977; Jordan & Pettway, 1985; Miller 1977; Poterba, 1986). However, others have
found that “long-term municipal bond yields tend to be much higher than predicted”
(Chalmers, 1998, p. 285). This empirical phenomenon has been labeled the “muni
puzzle.” Although this paper was not written to contribute to the muni puzzle literature, it
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is worth stating because one of the popular explanations is that municipal bonds bear
more default risk and include costly call options relative to taxable bonds (Chalmers,
1998, 2006).
Under the TCJA, underlying interest rate theory, financial theory, and capital
structure and debt capacity theories will be indirectly applied since the price of bonds
depends on their risk of default. Municipal defaults are possible, and during the 2020
COVID-19 pandemic, 50 municipals defaulted as of July 31, 2021, which Municipal
Market Analytics reported as the most since 2011 (Pellejero, 2020). However, U.S.
government bond default is near impossible, which is partially why “municipal default
risk exceeds the default risk of corporate and U.S. Treasury bonds” (Chalmers, 1998, p.
282). This closely parallels the situation with corporate bankruptcy; however, the price of
the municipal bonds is somewhat distorted from their corporate counterparts because
taxpayers ultimately bear the underwriting fees and costs.
Option Pricing Theory
Extensive literature existed on the corporate bond market and applying the
standard option pricing theory to the efficacy of refinancing and debt defeasance
(Alderson et al., 2017; Booth et al., 2014; Kerins, 2001; Newberry & Novack, 1999).
Although loosely referenced in the latter advance refunding papers, the value of the call
option has always been applied in the tax-exempt status. With the elimination of taxexempt advance refunding, the value of the call option has changed because advance
refunding issuances must now be taxable (Kalotay, 2021).
Under the new law, when municipals switch to taxable debt, they expect a direct
impact on the option value. Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) asserted: “At any exercise
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time, the holder of an American option optimally compares the payoff from immediate
exercise with the expected payoff from continuation, and then exercises the option if the
immediate payoff is higher” (p. 114). Much of the established advance refunding
literature focused on the valuation of the exercise features of the call option, which
justifies updating the call option calculation to reflect the recent tax law change (Brooks,
1999; Kalotay et al., 1993; Kalotay & May, 1998; Orr & de la Nuez, 2013; Zhang & Li,
2005). Looking at a post-TCJA environment, the “trade-off is between the realized
present value savings and the forfeited time value of the call option” (Kalotay, 2021, p.
50).
Controversy in Recent Literature
Additional justification for the continued analysis of the refunding option value
appeared in the most recent advance refunding literature, where conflict exists between
academics and practitioners on their respective conclusions. Ang et al. (2013) claimed
that advance refunding has zero net present value, and waiting to the call date is always
preferable because the transaction always destroys value. Kalotay and Raineri (2016)
rejected this claim and found a positive value or a “free lunch” with regards to the option
(p. 119). Ang et al. (2017) altered their central claim, finding that the timing of the
refunding can be optimal.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The primary research question guiding this study was: What is the impact of
TCJA on states’ advance refunding of debt? A subcomponent of this research question
was: Do states operate in aggregate, or do unique fiscal or economic variables create
unique refinancing behavior across different regions of the United States? Researchers
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studying public finance have found that large states with lenient budget rules experience
greater volatility in economic activity than other states (Krol & Svorny, 2007).
The literature revealed three agreed upon motivations for municipalities to engage
in an advance refunding transaction: (a) to capitalize on lower interest rates to attain
savings, (b) to restructure debt to create short-term budgetary relief or flexibility for
additional borrowing, and (c) to remove restrictive bond covenants (GFOA, 2019; Wood,
2008). These motivations have undergirded existing studies and this study, which was
designed to determine if the TCJA impacted these motivations.
This study included three hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 was: Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) regions will have a significant impact on advance refunding activity,
both in predicting advance refunding par value and the number of issuances, and this
activity will be unique across the eight regions of the United States. Past research has
shown volatility in regional economies through regional business cycles to which states
respond with varying degrees of fiscal policy (Cornia & Nelson, 2010; Gupta et al., 2018;
Krol & Svorny, 2007; Levinson, 1998; Owyang et al., 2005). One fiscal policy tool used
by states to combat volatility from economic cycles involves debt management, which
would include refinancing existing debt through an advance refunding (National
Conference of State Legislatures [NCSL], 2004).
Hypothesis 2 stated: The TCJA event has significantly changed states’ behavior
related to using advance refunding for their municipal debt offerings, with states issuing
less advance refunded bonds in both par value and in the number of deals. The issuance
of tax-exempt bonds has always been subject to federal regulations, and as these
regulations change, the industry must adapt. As shown in Figure 3, after the TCJA event,
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the volume of advance refundings as a portion of all tax-exempt GO issuances dropped
considerably, but this behavior change has not been evaluated through empirical
observation. Discussion of this hypothesis includes an exploration of what trade
publication authors and scholars have identified as a behavior shift after TCJA
implementation (Bond Buyer, 2019; Kalotay, 2018, 2021).
Hypothesis 3 was: The primary driving factor for advance refunding post-TCJA is
state tax revenue. In theory and in practice, a municipality should only advance refund
debt if it results in a positive net present value (GFOA, 2019). However, many
municipalities face severe financial constraints that affect their debt management
policies, which is why researchers have found that over 96% of all advance refundings
result in immediate cash flow savings (Ang et al., 2017). Because tax revenues fund each
respective municipality’s debt service, it is important to know what macroeconomic or
fiscal variables impact the volume of advance refunding in a post-TCJA environment
(Ang et al., 2017; Crone, 2005; Kidwell & Hendershott, 1978; Levinson, 1998; Owyang
et al., 2005).
Conclusion
This study contributes in numerous ways to the advance refunding literature.
First, this is the first study to include a statistical evaluation of the frequency or
motivation of advance refunding after the TCJA became law. Second, researchers in
many of the previous studies did not introduce a geographic component into their
analysis. To date, researchers in only three studies have used a limited sample addressing
geography; however, none of these focused solely on U.S. states (Dzigbede, 2017;
Moldogaziev & Luby, 2012; Vijayakumar, 1995). The geographic component provides
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valuable information because state tax revenue sources have vastly different revenue
elasticities from other municipal levels of government. And finally, the use of a new
variable, tax revenue, introduces a public finance measurement in the advance refunding
literature.
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
This literature review provides a discussion and synthesis of the foundational and
current literature surrounding the decision-making process of municipal advance
refunding. Notably, this paper presents an evaluation of advance refunding at the state
level only, and the literature covered in the review addressed the decision at the state and
local levels in aggregate.
This literature review is divided into four sections. The first section provides
historical background for the legislative changes and IRS regulations on the advance
refunding transaction. Much of the literature referenced these events, yet many do not
have a complete explanation or timeline of the legislative history. Thus, this historical
discussion is primarily for the reader’s benefit and to ground the academic literature’s
evolution over the last 60 years.
The second section provides an assessment of the literature on corporate bond
refunding. The study of corporate decisions created an early framework, which has been
frequently referenced in the initial studies on municipal bonds. This research
subsequently set the stage for the municipal refunding stream of research.
The third section provides a review of the empirical academic literature on
municipal bond refinancing. Although not as robust as the corporate literature, the studies
on this topic were mostly limited to the efficiency, timing of bond refunding, and the
value of the embedded call option. Not every study was directly applicable to this study’s
research question, yet each contributed to how the municipal advance refunding literature
has evolved into its current state.
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Finally, to address the specific research questions explored in this paper, relevant
business cycle literature was also included in this review. Researchers studying the
corporate debt stream have discussed the impact of the economic environment on debt
management decisions at length; however, researchers studying advance refunding have
not done the same. All levels of municipal governments are funded with their own unique
combination of tax revenue streams, which are directly impacted by their business cycles.
Historical Background
The United States saw its first municipal bond offering in 1812 when New York
City began building the Erie Canal. However, refundings only date back to the late
1860s, when Congress decided to differentiate callable and noncallable bonds by offering
higher yields on the former (Winn & Hess, 1959). This, along with the industrial
revolution, saw the U.S. municipal bond market grow exponentially until it peaked in the
1920s. Although the Great Depression dried up government tax revenues, causing 4,500
defaults across state and local governments, the 1930s also saw a rising volume of
refundings due to the low interest rates (Malanga, 2010; Winn & Hess, 1959). The
economic growth experienced by the private sector after WWII boosted spending by
municipals, and over the last half-century, infrastructure spending has shifted noticeably
from the federal government to state and local entities.
The practice of advance refunding became controversial in the early 1960s when
the main motivation was to gain substantial arbitrage revenues. With little legislation
regulating advance refunding at the time, municipalities would earn profits on their
escrow investments because the rate they could invest usually exceeded their borrowing
costs (Kidwell & Hendershott, 1978). The IRS recognized this and, in August 1966,
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announced that it would no longer allow arbitrage profit as the primary motivation for an
advance refund. Additionally, the IRS stipulated that if this occurred, the obligation
would lose its tax-exempt status (Dyl & Joehnk, 1976). The House Ways and Means
Committee addressed the IRS’s concerns and issued a series of regulations with the U.S.
Treasury Department that essentially prohibited arbitrage profits and became effective
starting May 1973 (Dyl & Joehnk, 1976; Kidwell & Hendershott, 1978).
Even though federal regulations restricting municipals from earning arbitrage
profits have existed since the late 1960s, research showed that advance refunding
continued to create tax shelters and revenue losses for the U.S. Treasury from the
practices of arbitrage (Kalotay & May, 1998; Petersen, 1987). The U.S Treasury and
congressional committees specifically targeted advance refunding in reform proposals as
early as 1984 and later included these in the final version of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
enacted on October 22, 1986 (Petersen, 1987). The major policy changes made to
advance refunding in 1986 only allowed future issues to be advance refunded once.
Before the change, they could be advance refunded twice (IRS, n.d.). To remedy the
arbitrage problem, a rebate procedure was included, requiring that any earnings from the
escrow be sent to the federal government. The procedure also required all bonds issued
after 1985 to be redeemed at their earliest possible date if an advance refunding resulted
in present value savings to the taxpayer or borrower (Driessen, 2020; Kalotay & May,
1998; Petersen, 1987).
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 represents the most significant change to the
municipal bond market before the TCJA eliminated the federal tax exemption for
advance refunding on municipal bonds in 2017 (Driessen, 2020; Petersen, 1987). The
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rationale behind the decision was the need to offset tax reductions in the bill with other
costs. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated the cost to the U.S. Treasury over the
next 10 years would be $17.4 billion if not repealed (Joint Committee on Taxation,
2017).
Since the enactment of the TCJA, legislators and lobbyists have worked to
reinstate the federal tax exemption for interest income earned on advance refunding
bonds. Multiple bills have been introduced to Congress to reinstate advance refunding;
however, none have been enacted into law (To Amend the Internal Revenue Code, 2018;
American Infrastructure Bonds Act, 2020; Investing in Our Communities Act, 2019;
LOCAL Infrastructure Act, 2021). During the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, interest grew
in the 2019 bill to reinstate tax-exempt advance refunding as an economic stimulus
measure for municipalities to offset the loss of tax revenue from the shutdown orders. In
July 2020, the U.S. Senate introduced a piece of legislation aimed at supporting
municipal infrastructure, which included restoring the tax exemption for advance
refunding bonds; however, this too failed to become law (Driessen, 2020; Lucia, 2020;
Wicker, 2020).
Although the main policy argument in the early years focused on the arbitrage
situation, the current discussion about tax-exempt advance refunding circulates around
the federal subsidy. Supporters argue that infrastructure typically financed with bonds
may not occur without this benefit, whereas opponents believe the federal subsidy is an
inefficient way to encourage investment, and the benefit goes primarily to the creditor
and not the municipality (Driessen, 2020).
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Corporate Bond Refunding
The corporate bond market literature included extensive analysis on the
effectiveness of refinancing debt. Much of this literature was grounded in option pricing
theory, where models have illustrated the value gained from refunding against the value
of the bond’s call option. Long-term corporate bonds are traditionally issued with a call
option, where the issuing company reserves the right to “call” the bond prior to the
bond’s maturity date. Typically, corporations will refund a bond by replacing it with
another that has a lower coupon or interest rate. According to standard option pricing
theory, a bond should not be called until the savings achieved by refunding equals the
value of the call option (Kalotay et al., 2007).
Bowlin (1966) conducted one of the first empirical studies showing that a
refunding decision that provided a rate of return exceeding the cost of the funds used to
finance the investment was profitable. Many researchers at the time looked at interest
savings (Bierman, 1966; Weingartner, 1967), and others looked at the timing and
opportunity costs associated with the decision (Boyce & Kalotay, 1979; Friedman &
Lieber, 1975; Kraus, 1973). Researchers in one branch of the refunding literature focused
on the impact on shareholder wealth. They used the net present value of the refunding
decision in their models, resulting in mixed findings, but they introduced new analytical
frameworks for future research (Sibley, 1974; Yawitz & Anderson, 1977). Researchers
conducting later empirical studies found that the timing of when to call a bond continued
to be a primary motivating factor, and as a result, corporations rarely maintained their
capital structure, which directly impacted shareholder wealth (Emery & Lewellen, 1990;
Lewellen & Rosenfeld, 1987; Longstaff & Tuckman, 1994; Mitchell, 1991). Others

18
looked at motivating factors for the decision to issue callable debt and at what point
refunding was utilized as a debt management tool (Boyce & Kalotay, 1979; Brick &
Palmon, 1993; Kalotay et al., 1993; Livingston, 1987; Yawitz & Anderson, 1977).
Overall, the literature on the refunding decision has helped practitioners in a fastchanging environment with more complex bond structures than in prior decades.
Because of the volatile interest rates in the 1970s and 1980s, many buyers and
sellers in the bond market expressed concern about the effect of call provisions on yields
and if there were ways to hedge against the associated risk. Researchers expanded upon
previous studies and calculated the value of a put option on bonds and the impact on
reoffering yields (Chatfield & Moyer, 1986; Riener, 1980; Yawitz & Marshall, 1981).
And although findings in this literature have noticeably impacted corporate debt
management, they have also created a foundation for much of the municipal debt
literature. Perhaps the greatest benefit has been the literature focused on understanding
firm behavior based on bond call decisions. In this stream of the callable bond literature,
researchers conducting empirical studies found that firms will use the refunding option to
reduce agency costs, although it is unlikely to be the primary deciding factor (Alderson et
al., 2017; Barnea et al., 1980; Crabbe & Helwege, 1994; Thatcher, 1985).
Municipal Bond Advance Refunding
Overall, the empirical academic literature focused on municipal bond financing
was less comprehensive than the corporate bond literature. The literature in this stream
began with the work of Dyl and Joehnk (1976) and Joehnk and Dyl (1979), who
highlighted the multiple ways municipal bonds differ from their corporate counterparts
while also offering a framework for the tax implications. These researchers shed light on
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the differences, yet they also pointed out how difficult and unique the advance refunding
method is when compared to current refunding. Babad and Speer (1978) looked
specifically at the arbitrage scenario that existed during an advance refund and proposed
an optimized procedure to maximize municipality savings. Dyl and Joehnk and Babad
and Speer set the stage for the future municipal bond refunding literature, and their work
is still referenced in current literature. Notably, at this point in history, it was assumed
that the sole motivating factor for an advance refund was savings to the issuer.
After the tax reform of 1986 limited the number of refunds on each issue,
researchers responded by focusing on the optimal timing to call the bond. Because bonds
could only be refunded once, practitioners and scholars needed to understand when they
could achieve the highest level of savings. They also continued analysis of the option
value of the transaction under the new tax law (Brooks, 1999; Kalotay et al., 1993;
Kalotay & May, 1998; Zhang & Li, 2005). Vijayakumar (1995) made a noticeable
addition to the literature by using variables such as the form of government, political
competition index, and whether or not the city received a certificate of excellence for
their financial reporting. This introduced a more public finance approach to the refunding
decision and provided for a more applicable understanding of debt management practices
for policy makers and regulators.
At the time of this literature review, researchers in only three studies had taken a
different approach from the option-value focused studies and conducted cross-sectional
analysis evaluating the advance refund decision from a geographical perspective and with
homogeneous samples. Vijayakumar (1995) chose to only evaluate bonds issued by cities
with populations over 10,000 people. Even then, he narrowed the sample by removing
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bonds where the issuer and those responsible for subsequent management were not the
same entity. Moldogaziev and Luby (2012) chose to evaluate the refunding decision only
using state and local bonds issued in California, and Dzigbede (2017) used a sample of
Texas school districts.
Of the more recent studies addressing advance refunding, the focus centered
around the option value of the refunding as well as how the conclusions related to
practice. In a 2013 paper, the National Bureau of Economic Research claimed that
advance refunding had zero net present value and asserted that waiting to the call date is
always preferable because the transaction always destroys value (Ang et al., 2013). The
paper was immediately criticized in a trade publication, The Bond Buyer, by two industry
experts on the transaction. Leonard Weiser-Varon (2013), a municipal bond attorney,
responded by stating, “some advance refundings are driven by factors other than interest
rate savings, such as the need or desire to eliminate troublesome covenants, and therefore
their timing and ‘success’ should not be evaluated solely on the economics” (para. 5).
Andrew Kalotay (2013), another industry expert who is a quantitative analyst and leading
authority on institutional debt management and fixed income valuation, corrected the
study by pointing out that “cashflow savings commence at the time of the transaction”
(para. 3) and that “it locks in savings no matter how interest rates evolve subsequently”
(para. 5). Weiser-Varon and Kalotay approached their critique of the study differently,
but they arrived at a similar conclusion. They believed the use of complex mathematical
equations and occasional incidences where practice produced less-than-optimal results
did not represent conclusive evidence to suggest the practice should be avoided or
eliminated completely.
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In a more formal response, Kalotay and Raineri (2016) published an article
expanding upon the advance refunding option and clarifying the opposing view that the
option offered a positive value or a “free lunch” (p. 119 ). The following year the authors
of the highly criticized National Bureau of Economic Research paper incorporated the
criticisms and changed their paper’s claim that refunding can be optimal (Ang et al.,
2017). Although the paper was published in the industry’s leading publication, the
Journal of Finance, it still garnered criticism from Andrew Kalotay (2017), who stated:
“Without the flawed original claim, it is unclear that what remains is particularly new or
insightful” (para. 3). Kalotay added that the paper revealed a “lack of familiarity with the
muni market” (para. 3).
Significantly, the TCJA in 2017 repealed tax-exempt advance refunding, creating
lasting impacts to the municipal bond market as well as those in practice. Kalotay (2018)
quantified the impact as increasing the cost of long-term municipal debt by roughly five
basis points annually, with everything else held equal. He later wrote about the evolving
trend of taxable refundings and how “interest rate risk can be mitigated by issuing
callable taxable bonds and replacing them with tax-exempt bonds once the original taxexempt bonds are retired” (Kalotay, 2021, pp. 49–50). Apart from these academic papers,
authors publishing in news and media outlets have written extensively about the topic
post-TCJA. Many of these contributors continually make a case for reinstating the
advance refund transaction.
Business Cycle
Although no overwhelming evidence exists of one motive that fits the average call
decision, multiple studies in the corporate stream have provided evidence that interest
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rate decreases and the economic environment directly impact call decisions, especially
with lower rated debt (Alderson et al., 2017; Booth et al., 2014; Kerins, 2001; King &
Maurer, 2000; McDonald & Van de Gucht, 1999). However, in the advance refunding
literature, this had not been explored to the same extent and warranted additional analysis
(Ang et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2021; Vijayakumar, 1995).
Business cycle theorists assume that an economy moves through all the phases or
periods of a business cycle: economic expansion, recession, trough, and recovery.
Although the U.S. economy experiences business cycles as a whole, each state also has
its own economy that can be influenced when certain regions experience business cycles
apart from others (Crone, 2005; Gupta et al., 2018; Levinson, 1998). States differ
substantially in their incomes, tax bases, and levels of spending; however, each is
uniquely impacted by its respective business cycle and other macroeconomic conditions
directly influencing their debt management practices (Cornia & Nelson, 2010; Poterba &
Rueben, 1999). Past researchers have used national aggregate data to evaluate
macroeconomic variables, yet states operate in homogeneous legal environments and face
many of the same fiscal pressures. Consequently, they provide a suitable sample type for
evaluating advance refunding in a post-TCJA environment (Ang et al., 2017; Crone,
2005; Kidwell & Hendershott, 1978; Levinson, 1998; Owyang et al., 2005).
In his seminal research, Levinson (1998) found that state fiscal policy can
influence a state’s business cycle, particularly in the larger states. Included in this fiscal
policy are balanced budget requirements, which Vijayakumar (1995) explored when he
found political and economic influences in call decisions. Because states are bound by
these balanced budget requirements, many municipalities face severe financial constraints
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that affect their debt management policies, which is why most advance refundings result
in immediate cash flow savings (Ang et al., 2017). Although some researchers have
challenged Levinson’s theory, they still concluded that state fiscal policy and economic
activity are associated (Krol & Svorny, 2007).
Conclusion
Researchers in the literature agreed upon three primary motivations for
municipals to engage in an advance refunding transaction: (a) take advantage of lower
interest rates to attain savings, (b) restructure debt to create short-term budgetary relief or
flexibility for additional borrowing, and (c) remove restrictive bond covenants (GFOA,
2019; Wood, 2008). However, researchers identified these motivations before the TCJA.
The law’s passage significantly reduced municipality’s advance refunding behavior, even
with record-low interest rates. Researchers conducting business cycle literature agreed
that state fiscal policy and economic events are related, thus, providing a basis for
integrating the regional analysis into the advance refunding research.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
The primary focus of this quantitative study was to evaluate the debt management
decision made by states within BEA regions and to determine the primary drivers for
advance refunding in states. In addition, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act was evaluated as a
noticeable event, and the time-series component of the statistical models described in
Chapter Four were used to determine if there were any noticeable departures in state
decision-making under the new tax policy. To do this, both data on the bonds traded as
well as the macroeconomic variables that influence fiscal decisions related to debt
management were needed. The evaluation of data in regions and also in two different
time periods (i.e., before and after the tax law) allowed for an evaluation of behaviors that
helped identify predictive motivations for advance refunding activity at the state level of
municipal government.
Design Statement
In most of the existing literature on advance refunding of municipal bonds,
researchers have focused on evaluating the call provision and calculating the option value
through cash flow savings analysis to explain the decision to advance refund. Although
this trend predominates in the advance refunding literature, Ang et al. (2017) attempted to
understand better what factors drive advance refunding activity, specifically “the role that
financial frictions and constraints play in influencing municipalities to advance refund
their debt” (p. 1668).
Frictions can involve anything that influences or impacts the economy, such as a
shock (Brunnermeier et al., 2012). For example, the Great Recession of 2008 made clear
that financial sector frictions can impact business cycle fluctuations, and as a result,
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should be included in macroeconomic models (Quadrini, 2011).
No researchers have published studies post-TCJA evaluating the decision-making
process of advance refunding under the new tax law. In addition, researchers in only three
studies have attempted to do a cross-sectional analysis of advance refunding. Dzigbede
(2017) only evaluated Texas school districts; Moldogaziev and Luby (2012) concentrated
on state and local issuers in the state of California, and Vijayakumar (1995) limited his
sample to cities larger than 10,000 in population. In the most recent study, Ang et al.
(2017) found that “macroeconomic variables confirm that advance refunding activity is
significantly influenced by the fiscal condition of states and local governments” (p.
1670); however, Ang et al. also found that the broader macroeconomic measures failed to
yield a significance in the regression. The lack of significance is partly because the
decision to advance refund is based upon local- or state-level financial frictions and
previous studies used national aggregate macroeconomic variables that would mitigate
regional or state-level business cycle fluctuations.
The focus of this study’s research questions is to expand upon the finding that
macroeconomic frictions influence the decision to advance refund. However, the
methodology in this study differed from previous studies by taking a cross-sectional
approach and only evaluated states’ decisions to advance refund.
States tend to utilize taxes with higher revenue elasticity, such as personal and
corporate income taxes, and each is comprised of a different mix of taxes, which are each
uniquely impacted by their macroeconomic conditions (Cornia & Nelson, 2010). Because
these tax revenues fund each respective state’s debt service, researchers must know what
macroeconomic situations, if any, impact the advance refunding decision in a post-TCJA
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environment (Ang et al., 2017; Crone, 2005; Kidwell & Hendershott, 1978; Levinson,
1998; Owyang et al., 2005).
To compare the unique fiscal situation a state experiences to all municipals in
aggregate, researchers must perform region-level analyses. In these analyses, they can
examine whether advance refunding activity can be explained and predicted as a state
response to macroeconomic frictions and if the TCJA event changed the state’s behavior.
Time-series regressions have long been applied to bond data, especially government
bonds with their easily accessible return data and lack of sensitivity to changing risk
characteristics (Ang et al., 2017; Elton et al., 1995; Fama & French, 1993; Maul &
Schiereck, 2017).
Data
The transaction data for municipal bonds was collected from the MSRB and
included every trade made through registered broker–dealers. Over the sample period
from January 2005 to December 2020, the MSRB database contained 113,809,798
individual transactions involving 2,268,814 unique municipal securities, which are
identified through a Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures (CUSIP)
number, a unique identifying number assigned to all registered bonds in the United States
and Canada. Because the MSRB database only contains very generic information about
each security, the other characteristics for the municipal bonds traded in the sample were
taken from Bloomberg LP.
The sample for this study included securities with a dated date between January 1,
2005, and December 31, 2020, yielding 2,268,814 unique CUSIP numbers. Isolating only
bonds with a state issuer type reduced the sample to 63,437.
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Regions or territories other than U.S. states were omitted, including the District of
Columbia, American Samoa, Canal Zone, Guam, Trust Territories, other territories,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. These exclusions reduced the sample to 61,121
bonds. To isolate those CUSIPs associated with advance refunding, another filter was
applied to include only refunded bonds. This reduced the sample size to 17,067.
Because this study was focused on state motivations and the impact of variables
on their decision-making, the sample only included bonds that were backed by the full
faith and taxing authority of the sovereign state governments, which excluded revenue
bonds. The two main types of bonds issued by states are GO and revenue bonds. GO
bonds are backed by the general credit and taxing power of the state issuing the bond,
which implies that all sources of revenue, unless specifically limited, will be used to pay
debt service on the bonds. Revenue bonds are used to finance a specific revenuegenerating project and are secured solely from the revenues generated from that project
(Vijayakumar, 1995, p. 215). Many states issue bonds for conduit entities that are not
accountable to state taxpayers for repayment. For example, Alaska international airports
issued refunding bonds via the state issuer; however, the fees and revenues generated by
the airports would repay those bonds, not the Alaska state taxpayer. To accommodate for
conduit issues, the issue type excluded revenue notes or revenue bonds as well as those
that had a security type listed as unknown. This reduced the sample to 11,656 bonds.
Of those bonds, the fields collected from Bloomberg LP for each CUSIP included
the issue date, municipal purpose (e.g., advance, current), issue price, yield on the issue
date, tax status (e.g., federal or state tax-exempt, taxable), coupon rate, coupon type (e.g.,
fixed, original issue discount, adjustable), municipal issue type (e.g., GO) issue size,
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maturity date, and the short name.
The first applied filter included only those bonds considered an advance
refunding. Bloomberg’s labels for refunding securities yielded a list including advance
refunding, crossover refunding, current refunding, economic defeasance, refunding
bonds, and refunding notes. Both crossover and defeasance are considered a type of
advance refunding (Dyl & Joehnk, 1976). Many of the CUSIPs labeled refunding bonds
or notes were frequently issued in a series. This occurred when a single underwriting of
refunding bonds included multiple CUSIPs (Ang et al., 2017). Bloomberg defined
refunding bonds and notes as a pre-refunding bond that is issued to find another callable
bond when the issuer decides to exercise its right to buy bonds back before the scheduled
maturity date. Researchers in the refunding literature used this same definition; thus, all
refunding securities were included except for those labeled current refunding, which
yielded a sample size of 9,457 bonds.
Finally, the sample required all bonds to have no missing information, which
yielded an ultimate sample of 8,716 bonds, or 75% of the original pool. The short name
and the CUSIP were used to identify the state associated with the advance refunding,
which produced data from 45 states that are actively trading. The other five states (i.e.,
Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, North Dakota, and Wyoming) did not have any activity during
the time frame. Each participating state’s bonds were organized according to their
respective BEA region. The variables used in the statistical models were separated based
upon the eight BEA regions (see Figure 4) and aggregated by time using quarters of
calendar years.
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Figure 4
Bureau of Economic Analysis Regions in the United States

Note. BEA Regions Map produced by the United States Regional Economic Analysis
Project, http://united-states.reaproject.org/. Reprinted with permission.
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The eight BEA regions also served as variables. These appear in Table 1.
Table 1
List of Variables and Related Information
Variable

Label

Frequency

Source

Par value of deals (D) Par value

Daily*

Bloomberg

Number of deals (D)

Par number

Daily*

Bloomberg

Time period (I)

Period

Quarterly

N/A

BEA regions (I)

Regions

N/A

Bond Buyer 20-GO
Index (I)

BB20 Index

Weekly*

U.S. Bureau of
Economic
Analysis
Bond Buyer

State tax revenue (I)

Tax revenue

Quarterly

U.S. Census
Bureau; Quarterly
Summary of State
& Local Revenue
Tables

State GDP (I)

GDP

Quarterly

Bureau of
Economic
Analysis; GDP
summary by state

State unemployment Unemployment
Quarterly
U.S. Bureau of
(I)
Labor Statistics
Note. Dependent variables are labeled (D), and independent variables are labeled (I).
GDP = Gross Domestic Product.
* Frequency is from the original data set and was converted into quarterly.
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Reliability of Data Sample
A query from Refinitiv Thomson Reuters was conducted to confirm the accuracy
of the low sample size compared to previous studies. Using the same dated date yielded
7,588 issues, limited to only states or state issuers and including only refunding. Given
the difference in data reporting for each respective database, this study’s final sample
accurately represents state advance refunding activity during the time period. The
reduced sample size compared to other studies in the literature is explained by limiting
the sample to only state and state authorities.
Another supporting factor explaining the large difference between this and other
studies’ samples involves the MSRB’s Electronic Municipal Market Access platform,
which details the count of all municipal issuers according to government type. Across the
50 states, a total of 96,239 municipal issuers exist, yet only 3,268, or 3.4%, of those
issuers, are at the state level, and 57.3% are at the city level (see Appendix A).
Variables
Variables from several sources were used in the regression for this study. This
section provides descriptions of them that coincide with Table 1 for a more consolidated
explanation of sources and methodology.
Time Period
The data in this study was divided into two time periods (i.e., before and after the
imposition of TCJA). Having data from these different periods allowed analysis from an
event perspective. The TCJA was enacted in late 2017 and went into full effect at the
beginning of 2018. Consequently, the first time period included securities with a dated
date between January 1, 2005, and December 31, 2017, and the other time period
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included securities from January 1, 2018, to December 31, 2020.
Municipal Bonds (Par Value and Par Number)
Municipal bonds are typicaly issued in a series, meaning that in a single
underwriting, bonds with a wide range of maturities are issued involving multiple
CUSIPs from the same original series (Ang et al., 2017). Bonds that are from the same
issuer on the same dates are referred to as a “deal.” However, researchers in previous
advance refunding literature rarely mentioned deals and typically measured these types of
bonds by CUSIP or used a specific sample of individual bonds (Ang et al., 2013, 2017;
Dzigbede, 2017; Moldogaziev & Luby, 2012; Orr & de la Nuez, 2014; Vijayakumar,
1995; Zhang & Li, 2005).
Because states have multiple advance refunded bonds outstanding, the literature
supported the use of a bond-level approach. In this approach, each bond is treated as a
separate observation (Maul & Schiereck, 2017). However, according to a personal
interview with a managing director of PFM Financial Advisors, a firm specializing in
municipal business, the proper way to measure a state’s activity level regarding advance
refunding is to measure in deals, not CUSIPs. Another personal interview with the chief
financial officer of a state finance authority explained that proper measurement of the par
value cannot simply involve sum the value of each CUSIP because multiple CUSIPs are
associated with the same par value. Both of the individuals interviewed asked to remain
anonymous. Their views were confirmed by Maul and Schiereck (2017) that identified
clustering biases when taking a bond-level approach because of the “likely high
correlation among bonds from the same firm, violating the assumption of independent
observations and leading to an inflated t-statistic” (p. 767).
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In an effort to contribute to the precedent set in previous literature while also
accommodating applied practice, the independent variables were regressed against two
different dependent variables (i.e., the number of deals and the par value of deals). State
bond data were filtered to yield only series with a unique issue date, issue size, and issuer
for each deal, returning a total of 875 deals with a par value of $409.6 billion. These deals
and their respective par values were summed for each quarter during the time frame by
state and then aggregated by region.
Previous literature did not include taxable advance refund bonds; however,
according to the personal interviews with the managing director and chief financial
officer, states have advance refunded municipal bonds into taxable status prior to TCJA
for various reasons; thus, taxable bonds were included in this study. The data included
8,716 bonds, of which 785 were taxable, and 7,931 were tax-exempt.
Bond Buyer GO 20 Municipal Bond Index
Data on the Bond Buyer GO 20 Index was retrieved from The Bond Buyer, a daily
newspaper covering the municipal bond market. This index is based on 20 state, city, and
county GO bonds that mature in 20 years and have an average rating equivalent to
Moody's Aa2 and Standard & Poor’s AA (MSRB, 2017). The index reports weekly. In
this study, the index was converted to a quarterly figure by averaging each week within
each respective quarter of the time frame.
State Tax Revenue
Each state’s total tax revenue was collected from the U.S. Census Bureau’s
quarterly summary of state and local government tax revenue tables. The data were
reported in thousands of nominal dollars, and the numeric format was converted to show
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all integers. Each state within the region with advance refunding activity was averaged
for a single quarterly value.
State Gross Domestic Product
State Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was collected from the BEA’s quarterly
summary by state, which was last updated March 26, 2021, to include the fourth quarter
of 2020. The data were reported in millions of chained 2012 dollars. Chained dollars are
a calculated figure applying national chain-type price indexes to the current dollar values
of GDP by state that adjusts it for inflation to allow a comparison of figures from
different years. The numeric format of the data reported in chained dollars was then
converted to show all integers. Each state within the region with advance refunding
activity was averaged for a single quarterly value.
State Unemployment Rate
Data were collected from the U.S. Census Bureau’s monthly employment status
of the civilian noninstitutional population for states and selected areas. For use in this
study, an average of the 3 months for each respective state and quarter was executed to
provide a quarterly unemployment rate for each state during the time period. Each state
within the region with advance refunding activity was averaged for a single quarterly
value.
Limitations
Because the study’s aim was to evaluate state municipal behavior, the data were
organized first by each respective state. This limited the number of observations for
several states, and the resulting low number of observations prevented a state-level panel
analysis. For example, Florida had a total of 661 advance refund bonds issued within the
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sample; however, once organized into a time-series format of quarters, the state yielded
only 29 observations. When organized by each calendar year, the number of observations
fell even lower (see Appendix B).
Because of the low number of observations, statistical significance at the state
level could not be obtained. As a result, the data were organized into BEA regions.
Although this format allowed regional business cycles to somewhat dilute each state’s
behavior, the model still provided insight into state advance refunding behavior.
Summary
Time-series regression models represent a well-established empirical approach to
evaluating quantitative bond data. Using both the number of deals and the par value of
deals issued by states within the eight BEA regions provided insight into the motivations
and regional behavior divergences among the states. Chapter Four provides the study
results and answers to the research questions while demonstrating that the methodology
described in this chapter was followed.
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CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the debt management decision made by
BEA regions of U.S. states between 2005 and 2020 and see what primarily drove advance
refunding and if the TCJA influenced decision-making in the states. This quantitative
study took data from both proprietary databases, such as Bloomberg and Bond Buyer, as
well as public databases, including those maintained by the U.S. Census Bureau and the
BEA.
The main statistical models executed in this study focused on the eight BEA
regions using the par value of deals (i.e., par value) and the number of deals (i.e., par
number) as the two dependent variables. The study included two dependent variables
because debt refinancing can be measured in one of two ways, either in the dollar amount
or in the number of deals or transactions. The use of two dependent variables captured
both measurements to show any divergence between them. The main statistical models
used to answer the research questions included a hierarchical linear regression and a
panel regression. Other statistical analytic tools were incorporated for moderation
analysis.
The remainder of this chapter presents the preliminary inferential findings,
including the descriptive statistics for the six variables. A clear understanding of the data,
with further explanation of the limitations and data organization, proved each hypothesis
with supporting statistics. Each of the three hypotheses was built upon the previous
results because they were all interconnected.
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Organization
The TCJA was enacted into law on December 22, 2017, and the provision related
to advance refunding went into effect on January 1, 2018. Thus, in addition to a regional
evaluation designed to illuminate geographic behaviors, the data were evaluated from an
event perspective that involved comparing pre- and post-TCJA enactment. This was
represented in the data as (a) before Quarter 1 (Q1) 2018 and (b) Q1 2018 and after, with
the variable name period.
A total of 64 observations existed when the data were organized into calendar
quarters, with 52 of those in the period prior to Q1 2018 and 12 in the period Q1 2018
and after. All data were evenly distributed by region, with each representing 12.5% of the
data. However, each year prior to Q1 2018 respectively represented 7.69% of the data,
while subsequent years represented 33% each. In addition, the quarterly time variable
allowed the analysis to determine if states preferred one quarter over another for
refinancing activity. Because state fiscal years mostly follow a July 1 to June 30
calendar,1 a pattern was easily identified.
As mentioned in Chapter Three, the missing data were due to states having
irregular advance refunding activity. To assess the impact and extent of the missing data,
descriptive statistical techniques of frequencies and percentages were used in this study.
The four independent variables for both periods (i.e., before Q1 2018 and Q1 2018 and
after) were found to be 100% intact, reflecting no missing data and a frequency of 416
and 96, respectively. The dependent variables (i.e., par number and par value) reflected

1

Those states not following the traditional fiscal year are New York (April 1), Texas
(Sept. 1), and Alabama and Michigan (Oct. 1).
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21.63% (n = 180) missing data in the period variable before Q1 2018, and 36.98% (n =
71) missing in the period variable Q1 2018 and after. The missing data for these variables
in the Q1 2018 and after period was anticipated with the noticeable reduction in
refunding issuances the municipal bond market experienced after TCJA implementation.
Preliminary Inferential Findings
The t test of independent means (see Table 2) showed a statistical significance for
all variables (Field, 2018; Salkind & Frey, 2020). The wide divergence in standard
deviations resulted in using Glass’s delta to measure the effect size (Richardson, 1996),
of which both dependent variables were very large. The range for tax revenue was
expected to be large because there was no adjustment for inflationary growth.
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Table 2
Independent and Dependent Variable Comparison by Time Frame
Variable/time frame

n

M

SD

t

g/Δ

Unemployment
(before Q1 2018)

416

5.94

1.85

3.46***

.50

Unemployment
(Q1 2018 & after)

96

4.93

2.74

BB20 Index
(before Q1 2018)

416

4.17

0.50

11.52***

1.68a

BB20 Index
(Q1 2018 & after)

96

3.23

0.76

Tax revenue
(millions)
(before Q1 2018)

416

4,318.71

2,365.27

4.35***

.59

Tax revenue
(millions)
(Q1 2018 & after)

96

5,802.20

3,140.84

GDP (millions)
(before Q1 2018)

416

347,895.07

16,6179.59

2.52**

.31

GDP (millions)
(Q1 2018 & after)

96

401,859.24

194,122.13

Par number
(before Q1 2018)

236

3.53

3.85

5.41***

1.64a

Par number
(Q1 2018 & after)

25

1.72

1.10

Par value (millions)
(before Q1 2018)

236

935.15

3,599.27

3.94***

1.51a

Par value (millions)
25
(Q1 2018 & after)
a
Very large effect (d ≥ 1.20).
**p ≤ .01.
***p ≤ .001.

214.28

478.05
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Preliminary Predictive Analyses
Predicting Par Value and Par Number
To further confirm a behavioral change occurred, a simple linear regression
statistical technique was used (Field, 2018; Salkind & Frey, 2020) to predict both the par
value and par number by period. Par value statistics was reported in millions.
Period Predicting Par Value
The predictive model for par value was statistically significant (F[1,510] = 3.83, p
2

= .05, R = 0.01), indicating period explained 1.0% variation. The variable period was
statistically significant in predicting the par value (B = -720.87; t(510) = -1.96; p = .05).
Table 3 contains a summary of findings for the predictive model for par value.
Table 3
Predicting Par Value by Period
Variable

B

(Intercept)

SE

935.15 159.51

Period 2018 Q1 & after

-720.87 368.37

95% CI

β

[621.78, 1248.53]

0.00

t

p

5.86 < .001

[-1444.58, 2.83] -0.09 -1.96

.05

Period Predicting Par Number
The predictive model was also statistically significant for par number (F[1,259] =
2

5.42, p = .021, R = 0.02), indicating that period explained approximately 2% of the
variance. The 2018 Q1 and after category of period was statistically significant in
predicting the par number (B = -1.81, t(259) = -2.33, p = .02). This revealed that moving
from pre- to post-TCJA, the mean value of par number decreased by 1.81 deals on
average. Table 4 contains a summary of the predictive model for par number.
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Table 4
Predicting Par Number by Period
B

SE

95% CI

β

t

p

(Intercept)

3.53

0.24

[3.05, 4.00]

0.00

14.70

< .001

Period 2018 Q1 & after

-1.81

0.78

[-3.33, -0.28]

-0.14

-2.33

.02

Variable

Effect of BEA Regions on Par Value
It was important to show if the differences between the period and region
variables on par value were statistically significant differences or if they occurred
randomly. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to identify any
statistically significant differences in par value by region and study period (Field, 2018;
Salkind & Frey, 2020).
Before Quarter 1 2018
The results of the ANOVA analysis were statistically significant (F[7, 408] =
8.88, p < .001), indicating significant differences in par value among the levels of region
represented in the study (see Table 5). The proportion of the variance was 0.13,
indicating the region variable explained approximately 13% of the variance in the par
value of advance refunding deals. The means and standard deviations achieved in the
ANOVA analysis appear in Table 6.
Table 5
Overall Effect of BEA Region Upon Par Value Before Q1 2018
Term

df

F

p

ηp2

8

7

8.88

< .001

0.13

9

408

Sum of squares

Region

7.11 × 10

Residuals

4.67 × 10
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Table 6
Mean, Standard Deviation, and Sample Size for Par Value by Region Before Q1 2018

Region combinations

M

Far West

For par value in millions
SD

n

4,310.52

9,173.18

52

Great Lakes

789.67

2,087.00

52

Mideast

599.56

835.06

52

New England

452.83

557.57

52

Plains

299.25

742.78

52

Rocky Mountain

24.77

68.90

52

Southeast

889.19

1,140.05

52

Southwest

115.44

337.77

52

Quarter 1 2018 and After
The results of the ANOVA analysis were statistically significant (F[7, 88] = 2.43,
p = .03), indicating significant differences in par value among the levels of BEA regions
(see Table 7). The eta squared was 0.16, indicating breaking the data into BEA regions
explained approximately 16% of the variance in par value. The means and standard
deviations achieved in the ANOVA analysis appear in Table 8.
Table 7
Overall Effect of Region Par Value Q1 2018 and After
Term

df

F

p

ηp2

6

7

2.43

.03

0.16

7

88

SS

Region

3.52 × 10

Residuals

1.82 × 10
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Table 8
Mean, Standard Deviation, and Sample Size for Par Value by Region Q1 2018 and After
For par value in millions
Region combinations

M

SD

n

Far West

676.75

891.45

12

Great Lakes

144.58

245.35

12

Mideast

103.58

267.10

12

New England

286.50

504.01

12

Plains

69.25

239.89

12

Rocky Mountain

28.17

97.57

12

Southeast

226.92

496.51

12

Southwest

178.50

399.86

12

Post Hoc Analysis
Paired t tests were used to assess differences between each pair of measurements
to further examine the difference of par value by region. Tukey pairwise comparisons
(i.e., Tukey’s honest significance test) were conducted for all significant effects (Field,
2018).
For the main effect of region before Q1 2018, the mean for Far West par value
was significantly greater than all the other regions (p > .001). For the main effect of
region in the Q1 2018 and after period, the mean of par value for far West was
significantly greater than for the plains region (p = .031) and significantly greater than for
the Rocky Mountain region (p = .016). This was consistent with the level of activity in
each of the respective regions during the sample time. The Far West region had the most
activity in both advance refunding CUSIPS and dollar amounts of the eight BEA regions,

44
and the Plains and the Rocky Mountains had the least. No other significant effects
manifested in the analyses.
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 stated: BEA regions will have a significant impact on advance
refunding activity, both in predicting advance refunding par value and the number of
issuances, and this activity will be unique across the eight regions of the United States.
Building upon the preliminary analysis that demonstrated the TCJA had a
statistically significant impact on advance refunding activity, a 3-step hierarchical linear
regression was conducted with both par value and par number as the dependent variables.
This was done to control for the other variables and see if adding the subsequent
variables improved the model’s ability to predict either the par value or the par number of
advance refunding deals. It also identified the relationship between the variables (Field,
2018).
Next, a multivariate analysis of the covariance (MANCOVA) and a univariate
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) were both performed to control for the respective
effects of region and quarter on the period variable (Field, 2018; Pituch & Stevens, 2016;
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2019). No other study in the literature had evaluated advance
refunding behavior by geographic region, so it was extremely important to determine
whether this activity occurred randomly or as a result of a repeatable trend. The analysis
used to address Hypothesis 1 set the basis for the analysis used in the subsequent
hypotheses.

45
Predicting Par Number
A 3-step hierarchical linear regression was conducted with both par value and par
number as the dependent variables. For Step 1, the variable period was entered as a
predictor variable into the unconstrained or baseline model. The study variable region
was added as a predictor variable into the model at Step 2, and study variable quarter was
added as a predictor variable into the model at Step 3.
All three steps proved statistically significant. The predictive model indicated that
all steps helped explain part of the variation in the par number of state advance refunding
deals, with period explaining 2.05% of the variation followed by region explaining
18.68%, and quarter explaining an additional 2.72% for an overall R squared of .2345, or
23.45% of the variance of par number explained. The results for the hierarchical
predictive model for the dependent variable of par number appear in Table 9.
Table 9
Predicting Par Number by Period, Region, and Quarter
2

2

Model

R

dfmod

dfres

F

p

ΔR

Step 1

0.02

1

259

5.42

.02

0.02

Step 2

0.21

7

252

8.49

< .001

0.19

Step 3
0.23
3
249
2.95
.03
0.03
Note. Each step was compared to the previous model in the hierarchical regression
analysis.
Model Finding Interpretation of Par Number of Advance Refunded Deals
Step 1 significantly predicted that moving from the before Q1 2018 period to the
Q1 2018 and after period decreased the mean par number on average (B = -1.84, t(249) = 2.59, p = .01). This indicated that the TCJA event decreased the mean value of the par
number of advance refunded deals by 1.84 on average.
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2

However, Step 2 posted the highest R , indicating the geographical analysis of
advance refunding explained 21% of the effect. The breakdown by region (see Table 10)
addressed the latter part of Hypothesis 1, illustrating there was unique activity across the
eight regions, and advance refunding activity was not uniform across the nation. The
Southeast region posted the least change, and the Rocky Mountains had the largest
difference in the par number of advance refunded deals on average.
Table 10
Predicting Par Number by Comparing the Far West to Other Regions
B

t(249)

p

Southeast

-1.80

-2.68

.008

Great Lakes

-2.79

-3.90

< .001

Plains

-3.60

-3.91

< .001

New England

-3.65

-5.11

< .001

Southwest

-4.24

-4.61

< .001

Mideast

-4.51

-5.99

< .001

Rocky Mountains

-4.89

-5.10

< .001

Region

Step 3 introduced the measurement of quarters, which increased the effect by 2%.
An analysis of movement between the first quarter to any of the others did not
significantly predict the par number of advance refunded deals. Moving from first to
second quarter resulted in a p = .06; moving from first to third yielded a p = .36, and
finally, moving from first to the fourth quarter produced p = .74. This indicated that states
did not prefer one quarter over another for advance refunding activity.
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Predicting Par Value
The same 3-step hierarchical linear regression was conducted using par value as
the dependent variable (see Table 11). The F test (Field, 2018) for Step 1 in the predictive
model was statistically significant and indicated that adding period accounted for a
significant amount of additional variation in par value (1%). Step 2 in the predictive
model was also statistically significant, suggesting that BEA regions explained an
additional 11.30% of the variation in par value. And finally, the F test for Step 3 of the
predictive model was nonstatistically significant, showing that quarter did not account for
a significant amount of additional variation in par value.
Table 11
Predicting Par Value by Period, Region, and Quarter
2

2

Model

R

dfmod

dfres

F

p

ΔR

Step 1

0.01

1

510

3.83

.05

0.01

Step 2

0.12

7

503

9.23

< .001

0.11

Step 3

0.12

3

500

0.73

.535

0.00

Predictive Model Interpretation (Par Value)
Step 1 significantly predicted par value of advance refunded deals (B = -720.87,
t(500) = -2.06, p = .04), indicating that moving from the before Q1 2018 to the Q1 2018
and after category of period decreased the mean value of par value by $720.87 million on
2

average. Step 2 posted the highest, R , indicating the geographical analysis of advance
refunding explained 11% of the effect. The breakdown by region (see Table 12)
addressed the latter part of Hypothesis 1, illustrating unique activity across the eight
regions and showing that advance refunding activity was not uniform across the nation.

48
The Southeast region posted the least change, and the Rocky Mountains had the largest
difference in the par value of advance refunded deals on average.
Table 12
Predicting Par Value by Comparing the Far West to Other Regions
For par value in millions
B

t(500)

p

Southeast

-2864.17

-5.25

< .001

Great Lakes

-2960.47

-5.43

.008

Mideast

-3122.62

-5.72

< .001

New England

-3207.55

-5.88

< .001

Plains

-3373.06

-6.18

< .001

Southwest

-3501.92

-6.42

< .001

Rocky Mountain

-3603.78

-6.61

< .001

Region

Step 3 introduced the measurement of quarters, which did not significantly predict
par value. When comparing a move from one quarter to another, there was no
significance. Moving from first to second quarter resulted in a p = .26; moving from first
to third yielded a p = .80, and finally, moving from first to the fourth quarter produced p
= .73, indicating that no move between quarters significantly affected the mean of the par
value of advance refunded deals.
Post Hoc Analysis
To further address Hypothesis 1, MANCOVA was conducted to assess if there
were statistically significant differences in the linear combination of the dependent
variables between the two levels of period when controlling for respective region and
quarter. The main assumption associated with the use of MANCOVA (i.e., homogeneity
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of regression slopes) was addressed first (Field, 2018; Pituch & Stevens, 2016;
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2019).
The assumption for homogeneity of regression slopes was assessed by rerunning
the MANCOVA to include interaction terms between each independent variable and
covariate (Field, 2018). As a result, the model with covariate and independent variable
interactions did not significantly explain more variance for either of the dependent
variables than the original model (F[20, 478] = 0.42, p = .99). This indicated that neither
of the region and quarter covariates interacted with the independent variable, and the
assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes was met.
The main effect for period in the MANCOVA analysis was statistically
significant, indicating that the linear combination of par number and par value was
significantly different between the time frames in period while controlling for region and
quarter. The covariate region was statistically significantly related to both dependent
variables, and quarter was nonstatistically significantly related to par number and par
value. Table 13 contains a summary of the results for the MANCOVA analysis.
Table 13
MANCOVA Finding: Par Number and Par Value by Period While Controlling for Region
and Quarter
Pillai

F

df

Residual df

p

ηp2

Period

0.03

3.52

2

248

.03

0.03

BEA region

0.25

5.10

14

498

< .001

0.13

Quarter

0.04

1.49

6

498

.18

0.02

Variable
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Follow-Up Post Hoc Testing
To further examine the effects of the TCJA event upon the dependent variables
while controlling for region and quarter, ANCOVA was conducted for each dependent
variable (Field, 2018).
Par Number
The results of the ANCOVA analysis for the par number of advance refunded
deals were statistically significant (F[11, 249] = 6.94, p < .001), indicating significant
differences among the values of period when controlling for region and period (see Table
14). The eta squared was 0.03, suggesting that dividing the data by period to focus on the
implementation of the TCJA explained approximately 3% of the variance in par number.
The means and standard deviations appear in Table 15.
Table 14
Analysis of Variance Finding: Par Number by Period When Controlling for Region and
Quarter
SS

df

F

p

ηp2

Period

74.15

1

6.72

.01

0.03

Region

671.60

7

8.69

< .001

0.20

Quarter

97.84

3

2.95

.03

0.03

2,749.00

249

Term

Residuals

51
Table 15
Marginal Means, Standard Error, and Sample Size for Par Number by Period
Controlling for Region and Quarter
Combination

Marginal means

SE

n

Before 2018 Quarter 1

3.07

0.24

236

2018 Quarter 1 & after

1.23

0.68

25

Par Value
The results of the ANCOVA analysis were statistically significant (F[11, 500] =
6.45, p < .001), indicating significant differences among the values of period when
controlling for region and quarter (see Table 16). The eta squared was 0.01, indicating
period explained approximately 1% of the variance in par value. Table 17 shows that the
marginal par value means decreased from 935.15 to 214.28 from before 2018 to 2018 and
after while controlling for region, indicating both region and period had a statistical
impact on the par value of advance refunding.
Table 16
Analysis of Variance Finding: Par Value by Period While Controlling for Region and
Quarter
Term

df

F

p

ηp2

7

1

4.26

.04

0.01

8

7

9.21

< .001

0.11

7

3

0.73

.54

0.00

9

500

SS

Period

4.05 × 10

Region

6.14 × 10

Quarter

2.09 × 10

Residuals

4.76 × 10
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Table 17
Marginal Means, Standard Error, and Sample Size for Par Value by Period Controlling
for Region and Quarter
Combination

Marginal means

SE

n

Before 2018 Q1

935.15

151.32

416

2018 Q1 & after

214.28

315.00

96

Hypothesis 2
Using the findings from Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2 required a more focused and
direct evaluation of the period variable and how that impacted both dependent variables.
Hypothesis 2 stated: The TCJA event significantly changed states’ behavior as it relates
to using advance refunding for their municipal debt offerings, with states issuing less
advance refunded bonds in both par value and in the number of deals.
To address the impact of the TCJA event, a linear discriminate analysis (LDA)
was conducted to evaluate the degree of separation among the dependent variables by the
study’s primary variable of period, which illustrated the behavior of states pre- and postTCJA implementation (Meyers et al., 2021). The analysis used in Hypothesis 1 showed a
difference in both dependent variables when related to period. However, LDA
disaggregates the linear combination in a more detailed manner than univariate ANOVA
and ANCOVA (Field, 2018). The rationale for using LDA was to emphasize the most
precise separation (i.e., discrimination) of the independent variable and dependent
variables.
In MANOVA and MANCOVA, a set of outcome measures are predicted from a
perioding variable. In LDA, however, the opposite occurs, predicting a perioding variable
from a set of outcome or dependent measures. In MANOVA and MANCOVA, the
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researcher focuses on identifying linear variates that best differentiate the periods. These
linear variates represent the functions in LDA.
Results
The LDA was conducted and evaluated using the Wilk's Lambda test to show
how well the independent variable, period, contributed to the model (Pituch & Stevens,
2016). The Wilk's Lambda test was statistically significant for par number (F[1, 259] =
5.43, p = .02), nonstatistically significant for par value (F[1, 259] = 0.78, p = .38), and
statistically significant for the overall model (x2(2) = 5.86, p = .05). These results
indicated a significant separation between the levels of period for par number and par
value.
Every component of the LDA has a standardized coefficient (i.e., standardized
canonical discriminant function coefficient) and a correlation for each variable included
in the analysis. The coefficients are the values used for the linear combinations to obtain
the linear discriminant components. The standardized coefficients for each variable and
linear discriminant component appear in Table 18.
Table 18
Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients for Each Linear
Discriminant Component
Variable

Linear Discriminant 1

Par number

1.19

Par value

-0.38

Correlation analyses were also conducted to determine which variables had a
large (r ≥ .50 or r ≤ .50) or moderate (r ≥ .30 or r ≤ .30) contribution to the LDA
components. Par number (r = 0.96) exerted a strong contribution and par value (r = 0.36)
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exerted a moderate influence on the component. Variables that reflect large correlations
for components that exhibit a significant percentage of trace (i.e., percentage of
separation between the periods) contribute the most in separating the periods. The
Pearson product-moment correlations for each variable and linear discriminant
component appear in Table 19.
Table 19
Pearson Correlations Between Each Variable and Linear Discriminant Component
Variable

Linear Discriminant 1

Par number

0.96

Par value

0.36
Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 3 built on the prior two hypotheses by involving a balanced panel
regression analysis to explore the motivating variable for the change in behavior. This
model was ideal because the dataset met the criteria of being balanced due to each panel
(i.e., region) being observed every consecutive quarter from Q1 2005 to Q4 2020. The
dataset also met the time-series requirement of this study (Torres-Reyna, 2007).
Specifically, Hypothesis 3 stated: The primary driving factor for advance refunding postTCJA is tax revenue.
Two major modeling approaches characterize and are commonly applied to panel
regression analysis: fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE). The FE modeling
approach to panel regressions has been referred to as the preferred approach (Vaisey &
Miles, 2017) and the gold standard (Schurer & Yong, 2012) for use in panel regression
modeling. Moreover, Bell et al. (2019) noted FE is perhaps the most used and
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recommended method of dealing with difference within and between effects in panel
regression modeling (p. 1057).
The rationale for using the RE modeling approach, unlike the FE model, was that
the variation across entities is assumed to be random and uncorrelated with the predictor
or independent variables included in the model. Greene (2008) noted that the primary and
critical distinction between FE and RE is whether the unobserved individual effect
embodies elements that are correlated with the regressors in the model and not whether
these effects are random in nature. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was addressed using both
modeling techniques for comparative purposes with both dependent variables.
Par Number
The predictive models for par number using both FE and RE techniques were
statistically significant (see Table 20). None of the independent predictor variables in the
RE model manifested at the statistical significance level of p ≤ .05. The variable of
unemployment (p = .07) did, however, manifest at the more liberal threshold for
statistical significance of p < .10. Two variables in the FE model manifested at
statistically significant levels: unemployment (p = .05) and tax revenue (p = .04).
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Table 20
Summary of Finding Table for Par Number: Fixed and Random Effects
Fixed effect
(Standard errors)
1.66
(1.97)

Random effect
(Standard errors)
-0.75
(1.72)

Unemployment

0.22*
(0.11)

0.22
(0.11)

Bonds

0.03
(0.45)

0.60
(0.38)

0.00(1) *
(0.00)

0.00(1)
(0.00)

-4.98
(3.47)

-4.14
(3.49)

F(4, 255) = 2.56; p = .03*

X2(4) = 9.63; p = .04*

Variables
Intercept

Tax revenue

Gross Domestic Product

Model
*p ≤ .05.
Par Value

The predictive models for par value using both FE and RE techniques were
statistically significant in predicting the dependent variable of par value (see Table 21).
The independent variable of tax revenue represented the most robust, statistically
significant predictor of par value within both the FE and RE models. The variable of
GDP was statistically significantly predictive of par value within the FE model (p = .04).
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Table 21
Summary of Finding Table for Par Value: Fixed and Random Effects
Fixed effect
(Standard errors)
-247.76
(1138.41)

Random effect
(Standard errors)
-1703.41
(998.43)

Unemployment

47.81*
(70.77)

82.69
(70.12)

Bonds

4.52
(254.40)

336.98
(221.55)

Tax revenue

0.49 ***
(0.13)

0.43***
(0.14)

-0.01*
(0.00)

0.00
(0.00)

F(4, 506) = 5.70;
p < .001***

X2(4) = 19.74;
p < .001***

Variables
Intercept

Gross Domestic Product

Model
*p ≤ .05.
***p ≤ .001.
Follow-Up Analyses

A follow-up analysis to confirm the findings from the balanced panel regression
was also conducted. Both a MANCOVA and hierarchical regression, which are both
fixed effects in nature, mirrored the findings achieved in the original panel regression
analysis with FE modeling. In the MANCOVA analysis, the variables of unemployment
and tax revenue were statistically significantly related to the linear combination of par
number and par value.
Post hoc analyses using univariate ANCOVA analyses were also conducted for
both dependent variables. The significance levels achieved in the post hoc ANCOVA
yielded identical FE values for par number and par value when compared to the panel
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regression model.
A second follow-up analysis using hierarchical linear regression for both
dependent variables was also conducted for confirmation. The findings achieved in the
analysis for both par number and par value at the fifth stage of the modeling process
mirrored the findings of the ANCOVA analyses and the initial balanced panel regression
analyses using an FE modeling approach.
Conclusion
This chapter presented the results of the statistical analysis in the context of the
study’s hypotheses. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the debt management
decision made by BEA regions of the U.S. states between 2005 and 2020 and see what
primarily drove advance refunding and if the TCJA influenced decision-making in the
states. The TCJA event determined a clearly delineated timeline, allowing a complete
analysis of behavior both before and after the event. Geographic analysis was conducted
to evaluate the behavior in different BEA regions of U.S. states and to identify the
primary driver for advance refunding at this level of municipal government.
The findings clearly showed that the three hypotheses built upon each other to
give a complete picture of the total impact of TCJA on state decisions to advance refund
their debt. This quantitative study used a variety of statistical techniques to assess the
variables and evaluate their impact on both dependent variables (i.e., par value and par
number). Chapter Five includes the summary for the critical analysis and discussion of
the three hypotheses as well as of the implications for practical application.
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
Over the last half-century, the practice of refinancing municipal debt has grown
frequent enough to draw regulatory attention from Congress. Historically, this type of
debt has offered state and local governments a less expensive way to fund government
infrastructure that would otherwise require other methods of financing, such as tax
increases (GFOA, 2003). Although smaller reforms to tax-exempt refinancing tools have
been the subject of federal legislation, the TCJA of 2017 represented one of the most
substantial changes to date, eliminating the ability of municipals to issue tax-exempt
advance refunded bonds (Bond Buyer, 2019; Kalotay, 2018).
Researchers in the academic literature agreed upon three primary motivators
behind municipal advance refunding transactions; however, these authors published their
views before passage of the TCJA. After passage, the frequency of advance refunding
increased, even with record-low interest rates. Consequently, a need arose to evaluate the
impact the law has had on municipal bonds.
The overall research question guiding this study was as follows: What is the
impact of TCJA on states’ advance refunding of debt? A subcomponent of this research
question was: Do states operate in aggregate, or do unique fiscal or economic variables
create unique refinancing behavior across different regions of the United States? Authors
of public finance literature found that large states with lenient budget rules experience
more volatile economic activity than other states (Krol & Svorny, 2007). Evaluation of
this subproblem involved discriminate analyses and multiple regression models.
This study resulted in numerous contributions to the advance refunding literature.
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This was the first study to address the frequency of advance refunding and the motivation
behind it after the TCJA became law. In addition, many researchers investigating similar
topics have not incorporated a geographic component into their analysis. At the time of
this study, only three studies had relied on a limited sample based, two of which were on
geography; however, none of these focused solely on states. This geographic distinction
is important because state tax revenue sources differ greatly from other municipal levels
of government, a difference that likely influences debt management decisions. Finally,
the use of a new, variable tax revenue introduces a public finance measurement, shedding
light on a new advance refunding motivator for municipals.
The remainder of this chapter addresses the study’s findings by research
hypotheses, followed by the major implications for practical application. The chapter
concludes with recommendations for future research.
Findings by Research Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 stated: BEA regions will have a significant impact on advance
refunding activity, both in predicting advance refunding par value and the number of
issuances, and this activity will be unique across the eight regions of the United States.
Academic researchers have described regional economies as volatile and subject to
regional business cycles to which states respond with varying degrees of fiscal policy
(Cornia & Nelson, 2010; Gupta et al., 2018; Krol & Svorny, 2007; Levinson, 1998;
Owyang et al., 2005). Debt management (e.g., refinancing existing debt through an
advance refunding) represents one form of fiscal policy action (NCSL, 2004).
The statistical analysis that included geography produced evidence that states
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operate independently from nationwide trends, validating the hypothesis. The predictive
model showed that each state’s economic region accounted for 21% of the number of
advance refunded bonds, also explaining 11% of the dollar value of advance refunded
debt.
The Far West and New England states had more activity than the Plains and
Rocky Mountains, which aligned with debt capacity limitations as well as regional
economic fluctuations during the sample period. When accounting for time periods preand post-TCJA, advance refunding in the Southeast states experienced the least impact,
and the Rocky Mountains experienced the most in both the number of advance
refundings and the dollar value. The means for both measurements of advance refunding
decreased for time periods pre- and post-TCJA while controlling for region. This showed
the TCJA had a statistically significant impact on advance refunding while controlling for
region.
Hypothesis 2
The analysis used in Hypothesis 1 revealed a difference in state behavior when
evaluating it according to period (i.e., pre- and post-TCJA implementation), but this
finding required more in-depth analysis to confirm it. Hypothesis 2 stated: The TCJA
event significantly changed states’ behavior as it relates to using advance refunding for
their municipal debt offerings, with states issuing less advance refunded bonds in both
par value and in the number of deals.
Both the par number and the par value of advance refunded state debt were
significantly influenced when evaluated by the time variable. In aggregate, the TCJA
reduced advance refunding activity by 1.84 deals on average, or $720.87 million, when
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comparing pre- and post-TCJA activity. This finding validated Hypothesis 2.
The findings associated with this hypothesis are consistent with both academic
and trade literature that identified a significant behavior shift after TCJA implementation
(Bond Buyer, 2019; Kalotay, 2018; Wallwork, 2018). The par number of bonds showed a
stronger influence from the event than the par value. This is reasonable because the
legislation was intended to eliminate advance refunding into tax-exempt debt; however, it
placed no limit on the value of the debt if the decision to advance refund into taxable debt
was carried out.
Hypothesis 3
The third and most telling hypothesis addressed the motivators behind state
advance refunding activity. Corporate literature showed that the economic environment
directly impacted the call decision, especially with lower rated debt (Alderson et al.,
2017; Booth et al., 2014; Kerins, 2001; King & Maurer, 2000; McDonald & Van de
Gucht, 1999). Thus, it was important to determine if similar economic variables had the
same impact on a municipal’s decision or if another explanation could be identified.
Hypothesis 3 stated: The primary driving factor for advance refunding post-TCJA is tax
revenue.
The analysis revealed both unemployment and tax revenue significantly affected
the advance refunding decision when predicting the number of bonds. When evaluated by
the dollar value of advance refunding, GDP and tax revenue were both significant. In
each case, tax revenue was found to be the stronger and better predictor. This finding
supported Hypothesis 3.
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Major Implications for Practical Application
Evidence showing tax revenue as the primary driving variable is not surprising if
evaluated from a public finance perspective. States differ substantially in their incomes,
tax bases, and levels of spending, and each is uniquely impacted by its respective
business cycle and other macroeconomic conditions directly influencing their debt
management practices (Cornia & Nelson, 2010; Poterba & Rueben, 1999). In addition,
states are bound by balanced budget requirements and debt capacity limits (NCSL, 2004).
Identifying tax revenue as a major driver also expands upon research by Ang et al.
(2017), showing “strong evidence that advance refunding activity increases when states
and local governments experience declines in current tax revenues or budget deficits” (p.
1679).
The knowledge that state tax revenue drives state advance refunding decisions
benefits practitioners who must avoid hasty decisions made to meet immediate cash flow
needs rather than serve the state taxpayer’s best interest. In addition, a misuse of data has
existed in the municipal debt literature because researchers have aggregated both state
and local debt. It was the goal of this research to introduce a methodology for separately
evaluating different levels of government.
One approach that will help separate state and local debt research involves
incorporating more public finance analysis into what has traditionally been a very
corporate approach. Trade publications and analysts have historically taken a
mathematical approach to evaluating municipal bonds; however, similar to the corporate
bond industry, multiple factors not directly associated with financials influence a firm’s
decision-making process. Because municipal levels of government ultimately answer to
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the taxpayer with varying degrees of regulatory pressures, financial decisions differ
vastly from the private sector and warrant a different approach. Such things as tax
revenue elasticities, constraints on revenue generation, constitutional and statutory
regulations, and sophistication of debt management methods all represent important
considerations for those in the municipal bond market.
Practitioners no longer prefer the method of evaluating advance refunding solely
by valuing the call option, and under the new tax law, this approach should be updated
(Brooks, 1999; Brown, 2011; Kalotay et al., 2007; Orr & de la Nuez, 2013; Zhang & Li,
2005). According to the personal interviews referenced in Chapter 3, practitioners have
already moved toward a focus on breakeven analysis. However, researchers in the most
recent literature on this topic still focused on the value of the call option (Chen et al.,
2021; Kalotay, 2021), and others have continued to use complicated mathematical
explanations for public debt management decisions (Lewin & Sardy, 2020). Practitioners
must work with elected officials and government bureaucrats who are unwilling to
consider lengthy mathematical equations before making debt management decisions.
Researchers must acknowledge this and try to adopt more public finance approaches that
can be put into practice.
Recommendations for Future Research
A need exists for more research on appropriate measurement techniques for
municipal bonds. Researchers have historically analyzed bonds on an individual or
CUSIP basis, while practitioners issue and measure municipal debt in deals. Clarifying
this will help future researchers categorize debt so that there is less skew in models
evaluating refinancing frequency.
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Another area ripe for study is the application of the same statistical approach used
in this study while isolating different levels of local governments to determine their
motivations. Cities, counties, and school districts all operate differently across the 50
states, which impacts their debt management decisions. For example, local governments
that are funded primarily with property taxes with strict limitations will make vastly
different debt management decisions than those with more generous property tax
limitations or additional taxing authority, such as a local-option sales tax or a local
income tax. Future research on local governments should be done at the state level to
account for the homogeneity of regulatory environments.
Following up on one of the limitations experienced in this study, more research
should be conducted at the individual state level. Given that certain regions have more
advance refunding activity than others, it would be valuable to take a deeper dive into
specific states to see if the motivations for advance refunding are unique to states with
certain tax structures. For example, researchers could explore whether California is still
motivated by tax revenue or by another public finance motivation when evaluated in
isolation from the other Far West region states. Some states, due to their debt capacity
limits, will never have enough advance refunding activity for a state-level analysis, but
they might be prime candidates for city or state analysis. Conducting state-level analyses
of municipal governments would also introduce more niche public finance variables to
explore other possible motivating factors not yet identified in the current literature.
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APPENDIX A
Count of all Municipal Bond Issuers by State and Level of Government
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma

State

City

County

Other

All Issuers

75
40
60
56
302
70
65
30
84
42
28
32
113
80
79
40
87
61
47
76
126
66
54
47
89
34
63
16
43
94
44
112
57
32
105
97

1,537
106
738
1,111
7,459
1,998
382
89
62
684
16
291
3,131
3,226
2,230
1,485
605
1,387
281
151
745
2,893
3,177
760
1,717
281
1,372
155
10
113
42
220
39
32
2,441
705

555
0
528
418
1,284
680
3
31
1,287
1,030
26
199
1,484
764
258
764
1,027
1
12
211
19
716
398
500
1,288
475
1,054
100
11
289
143
354
427
122
847
929

9
1
10
3
54
10
4
14
2,321
238
0
1
14
16
5
7
251
296
24
31
8
15
3
0
569
5
3
1
231
1,542
431
2,965
564
685
25
1

2,176
147
1,336
1,588
9,099
2,758
454
164
3,754
1,994
70
523
4,742
4,086
2,572
2,296
1,970
1,745
364
469
898
3,690
3,632
1,307
3,663
795
2,492
272
295
2,038
660
3,651
1,087
871
3,418
1,732
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Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Sum of Total

28
56
51
69
36
19
130
43
36
62
69
49
57
17
3,268

740
1,921
2
6
34
836
4,887
642
52
475
950
7
2,780
130
55,133

419
1,000
3
384
54
491
1,863
182
4
546
797
341
135
163
24,616

15
1,327
124
408
458
2
16
1
24
136
20
323
11
0
13,222

1,202
4,304
180
867
582
1,348
6,896
868
116
1,219
1,836
720
2,983
310
96,239
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APPENDIX B
Municipal Bond Data by State and Associated Quarters
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee

CUSIPs
53
39
90
89
1,006
85
238
76
661
159
274
95
15
14
167
56
102
272
109
257
165
88
84
8
309
108
80
13
114
116
462
13
587
134
258
218
14
505

Quarters
4
4
4
6
33
7
16
6
29
12
14
4
1
1
11
4
14
16
7
11
7
5
7
2
10
8
6
2
5
9
18
1
16
12
13
7
2
26
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Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin

240
15
102
105
614
91
416

12
3
7
7
20
5
25

